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1. The works of Ernest Sosa claims to provide original and thought-provoking contri-
butions to contemporary epistemology in setting a new direction for old dilemmas about the 
nature and value of knowledge. Judgment and Agency (2015) presents some new developments 
in his ideas. This book, described by Ram Neta (2015) as “both monumentally important and 
largely successful”, brings together eleven essays, mostly based on articles previously published 
in journals and collected works. These texts address the principal themes of Sosa’s philosophy, 
such as the nature and value of epistemic achievements, the different degrees of belief, the 
interaction between animal justification and reflective justification, the point of ancient and 
modern skepticism, and the moral, social and pragmatic aspects of knowledge.
As we know, virtue epistemology (SoSa, 1991, 2007, 2009) provides a solution to the dis-
putes that monopolized the epistemological debates of the 1960s and 1980s, between, on the 
one hand, foundational and coherentist theories about epistemic justification and, on the other 
hand, externalist and internalist conceptions about the nature of knowledge. These foundational 
and coherentist, externalist and internalist positions address aspects relevant to our cognitive 
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lives, however, their defenders are inclined to refute other positions, even when they contain in-
tuitively relevant ideas: can we set aside the idea that we are natural beings and that the way in 
which we are embedded in the natural world plays a constitutive role in our mental lives? Can 
we also reject the idea that reflection and a broad understanding of our cognitive achievements 
play a central role in our lives?
Sosa argues that knowledge requires true belief produced by something that is related to 
the, natural or learnt, skills and competence that allow someone to pursue and reach the truth. 
The idea of apt performance is crucial for both knowledge and action because it involves the idea 
of an achievement based on the deliberate endeavor of the person in the capacity of agent. In 
this sense, Sosa (2007, pp. 22-43) uses the example of an archer shooting an arrow at a target 
in order to illustrate the fact that one of the demands which may be required for knowledge is 
the fact that the cognitive agent must undertake a specific type of performance based on certain 
skills. Once this archer is truly competent, we expect that he will hit the target because of his skill 
and not because of some other factor:
Performance whose success manifests the relevant competence of the performer avoids 
thereby a kind of luck. According to competence virtue epistemology, knowledge is a special 
case of that. Knowledge of a sort is belief whose correctness is attained sufficiently through 
the believer’s epistemic competence, belief that is thus “apt”. (SoSa, 2015, p. 9)
The cognitive agent is someone who forms a true belief in virtue of their competence to 
form true beliefs.
2. Sosa makes a distinction between “animal knowledge” and “reflective knowledge” 
(SoSa, 2007; 2009): when a belief is correctly attributed to a competence exercised under the 
appropriate conditions, this counts as apt and as knowledge of a certain type, i.e. animal knowl-
edge (SoSa, 2007a, p. 93). The adjective animal does not have negative connotations, but merely 
serves to emphasize the natural sense of the process of acquiring beliefs; its paradigm is per-
ceptual knowledge. Animal knowledge requires apt belief without, however, requiring defensible 
apt belief, in other words an apt belief that the subject aptly believes is apt, and the subject can 
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Reliabilism (Goldman, 2012) as a form of epistemic externalism declares that the fact that 
the cognitive agent does not know how he forms true beliefs and does not have any idea that 
the procedure is reliable does not prevent him from having knowledge, because knowledge 
does not require reasons. Virtue epistemology inclines towards externalism and reliabilism and 
accepts that an agent has animal knowledge only if his belief is apt, in other words: a) the belief 
is true, b) it is produced by intellectual virtue, c) the subject obtains the truth from his intellec-
tual virtues. On the other hand, virtue epistemology also accepts the relevance of something as 
an intentional awareness, an epistemic perspective: the agent who is conscious of the ways and 
means in which he forms beliefs (in other words, he is careful to avoid mistakes and takes ac-
count of the available evidence) will be more virtuous and, as such, more reliable than someone 
who does not have this attitude. We can therefore admit that the epistemically virtuous person 
exercises both externalist excellence (is involved in reliable processes proved by nature, by their 
perceptual virtues, by society) and internalist excellence (an agent is virtuous if he has good 
motives for supporting what he believes).
For Sosa, reflective knowledge requires not only apt belief but apt belief that is defensible 
as apt (SoSa, 2007, p. 24; 2009, pp. 135-153; 2011, pp. 67-95). Reflective knowledge is actively 
acquired as the result of an intentional investigation; it requires the agent to undertake voluntary 
intellectual activities: thinking about evidence, formulating hypotheses, evaluating objections, 
considering alternatives, and formulating conjectures, as is the case with science and philosophy. 
3. Judgment and Agency goes one step further, since Sosa intends to develop his theory of 
human knowledge (as seen in Sosa, 2007 and 2009) “further than before, by taking up issues of 
metaphysics and ethics (broadly conceived) that arise for it” (SoSa, 2015, p.1).
We would like to highlight two points here. A large number of commentators and philos-
ophers divide virtue epistemology into two branches, “reliabilist virtue epistemology” (associat-
ed with Sosa and John Greco) and “responsibilist virtue epistemology” (associated with Linda 
Zagzebski, Jonathan Kvanvig and Jason Baehr) (axtell, 2000). The latter is based on a direct 
criticism of reliabilism and is specifically located in the axiological, evaluative and moral aspects 
of knowledge. Intellectual virtues are strictly the agent’s characteristic traits related to their 






that they have a motive or inspiration to act in a certain way in order to carry out an intellectual 
good, principally to attain truth. In a frank debate with Jason Baehr (2011) – and in the light 
of an interesting reinterpretation of the skeptical tradition in Descartes and Sextus Empiricus 
– Sosa (2015, pp. 2-3; 34-61; 215-254) considers that a “true epistemology will indeed assign to 
such responsibilist-cum-reliabilist intellectual virtue the main role in addressing concerns at the 
center of the tradition”.
The second point refers to the two notions that figure in the book title, agency and ju-
dgment. For Sosa, someone is an agent if they have the capacity to perform actions freely and 
deliberately endeavor to perform them. Epistemic agency is present if this person has the capa-
city to undertake an epistemic performance by choice. Judgment, for its part, is the exercise of 
epistemic agency, when the person establishes a goal to reach higher levels of epistemic perfor-
mance (“full aptness”, “knowing full well”), as found in the philosophical traditions started by 
Pyrrhonism and in Descartes’ concept of “scientia”.
As the first part of the book suggests, Judgment and Agency proposes an extended and 
unified virtue epistemology, which goes beyond virtue epistemology, deepening and extending 
its previous positions, principally that of “reflective aptness”. Judgment is identified as a fully 
alethic assertion which aims for both aptness and accuracy. From this point of view, an apt ju-
dgment is a fully apt assertion because, as well as seeking truth, it surpasses that which is only 
reflectively apt (for “reflective aptness” the condition of aptness and the condition of aptly re-
presenting it as apt are autonomous). Judgment as an exercise of epistemic agency is a fully apt 
performance because it is the kind of performance which necessarily expresses the competence 
that an agent exercises when he freely decides to undertake an investigation. From the point of 
view of tradition, crucial epistemic competence and agential performance are originally at the 
center of any philosophical investigation about knowledge, while, in the meantime, many cur-
rent epistemologists, be these associated with reliabilism or responsibilist virtue epistemology, 
have neglected this aspect…
4. In June 2015, under the auspices of the Postgraduate Program in Philosophy at the Fe-
deral University of Bahia (UFBA) and the Teaching, Philosophy and History of Science Program 
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nation for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES – PAEP 2012, process 
number 342229) and coordinated by both the Grupo de Investigações Filosóficas (CNPq) and the 
Skepticism Working Group (GT-Ceticismo) of the National Association of Postgraduate Studies 
in Philosophy (ANPOF), a group of Brazilian philosophers met in the city of Salvador, Bahia, 
Brazil in order to converse with Professor Ernest Sosa about his book Judgment and Agency. 
This book symposium brings together contributions from the participants at this meeting. Only 
Professor João Carlos Salles, as a result of his pressing commitments as Rector of Universidade 
Federal da Bahia was unable to contribute his text to this publication. We would, however, like 
to extend our sincere thanks to him for his valuable participation.
The meeting that took place in Bahia was a truly unique opportunity for the participants. 
As well as being one of the most important philosophers of our time, Professor Ernest Sosa is 
also highly educated and polite, open to dialogue, attentive to criticisms, and respectful of his 
interlocutors. We were able not only to discuss and clarify points in Sosa’s arguments, but also 
to establish a frank dialogue. For the postgraduate programs involved in promoting the event, 
this signified an important step in terms of their international involvement, since they then 
began to address the agenda of current, significant debates in the philosophical community.
We would like to thank two specific supporters of this project. This publication would not 
have been possible without the encouragement of Juan Comesaña and Edgar Marques. Juan 
provided initial contact with Ernest Sosa, while Edgar, the Editor of Analytica, enthusiastically 
accepted our proposal to publish this book symposium.
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